Dynamic Panics: Theory and Application to the Eurozone by Stangebye, Zachary
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Dynamic Panics: Theory and Application
to the Eurozone
Zachary Stangebye
University of Notre Dame
14 April 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69967/
MPRA Paper No. 69967, posted 15 March 2016 14:42 UTC
Dynamic Panics:
Theory and Application to the Eurozone∗†
Zachary R. Stangebye‡
Abstract
It is shown in a standard quantitative model of sovereign debt and default that sentiment shocks can alter
the distribution of fundamental defaults. The channel through which this occurs is a new type of dynamic
lender coordination problem in sovereign debt markets that I call a dynamic panic. During a dynamic
panic of this kind, expectations of future negative investor sentiments dilute the price of long-term debt;
the sovereign’s optimal response to such a panic can be to borrow aggressively, which justifies investors’
fears of dilution. Such panics generate naturally many of the unique features the recent Eurozone crisis,
and so I explore policy implications in this environment. I find that rate ceilings are an ineffective policy
tool but that liquidity provision, appropriately implemented, can eliminate such panics.
JEL: E44, F34, G01, H63
Keywords: Sovereign Debt Crises, Confidence-Driven Crises, Long-Term Debt
∗First Draft: 07/31/2014. This Draft: 4/14/2015. I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, for his constant
support and guidance throughout the course of this project. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee,
Ufuk Ackigit, Guillermo Ordon˜ez, and Satyajit Chatterjee, for their support, as well as Leonardo Martinez, Burcu Eyigungor, Manuel
Amador, Javier Bianchi and seminar participants of Penn Macro Club, NYU, Princeton EconCon, and the Federal Reserve Banks of
Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Chicago, Dallas, and New York for useful discussions and comments. I also acknowledge the Becker-Friedman
Institute and the Macroeconomic Modeling and Systemic Risk Research Initiative for financial support. Any errors or omissions are
my own.
†Most recent version available at http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/graduate-program/candidates/zachary-stangebye
‡Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104. E-mail: zs-
tang@sas.upenn.edu
1. Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), there has been a folk intuition in the
sovereign debt and default literature that market sentiments can have real effects. The intuition is as
follows: When investors expect the sovereign to default they demand a high spread, which makes repayment
costly and raises the default frequency; on the other hand, when lenders do not expect a default they
demand a low spread, which reduces the burden of repayment and with it the default frequency.1
Casting the impact of sentiments in this light alone, however, can be overly restrictive. There are other
channels through which sentiment dynamics can impact sovereign debt markets, even while retaining
the tractable Markov-Perfect structure preferred by the quantitative literature. In particular, this paper
shows that sentiment shocks can alter the distribution of fundamental defaults. In other words, negative
sentiment shocks can induce the sovereign to venture into regions of the state space where fundamental
default is far more likely. The channel through which this occurs is a dynamic lender coordination failure
that I call a dynamic panic.
During a dynamic panic of this kind, which I will call a non-default-relevant dynamic panic, a negative
shock to sentiment today sends a signal that future sentiment will likely be low, which dilutes the price
of long-term debt. In anticipation of this dilution, investors demand compensation in the form of high
spreads. In the face of these non-fundamental high spreads, the sovereign can find it optimal to borrow
excessively rather than default or delever because the typical default-risk channel2 that induces saving in
the face of adverse shocks is no longer present since sentiment shocks themselves never cause default. This
excessive borrowing dilutes the value of long-term debt and justifies investors’ initial fears.
These non-default-relevant dynamic panics are not a mere theoretical curiosity. I will show that, with
only minor modification3, they are already present in standard quantitative models in the literature. I will
provide as an example the calibrated model of Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), which was not initially
designed to allow for such non-fundamental borrowing crises.
1This intuition was formalized in some form in the models of Calvo (1988) and Cole and Kehoe (1996).
2For an in-depth discussion of this mechanism, see Arellano (2008). Essentially, during an adverse fundamental shock, there are two competing
forces: A borrowing motive driven by a high marginal utility, and a saving motive driven by an increase in the country’s interest rate, which jumped
because of increased default risk. In quantitative applications, the latter nearly always dominates, though there can be exceptions e.g. Conesa and
Kehoe (2012).
3The only modifications that need to be made are an augmentation of the state space to include a non-fundamental and a slight increase in
the degree of absolute risk-aversion.
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This unusual feature of borrowing into high spreads, which comes quite naturally out of the crises in my
model, is a hallmark feature of the Eurozone crisis and the one that has attracted the most attention from
the recent literature (see Lorenzoni and Werning (2013), Corsetti and Dedola (2013), or Conesa and Kehoe
(2012)). In light of this similarity, I explore the policy implications of dynamic panics. I find that in this
environment an interest rate ceiling, which has been proposed as a potential policy, would be ineffective.
To see why an interest rate ceiling is ineffective during a dynamic panic, it is helpful to understand
why it would normally work. The justification for such a policy is grounded in Calvo’s (1988) framework
in which there are two ways a sovereign can generate the same of revenue: Issue a small amount of debt
at low spreads, which are low because the probability of default is low, or a large amount of debt at
high spreads, which are high because the probability of default is high. Through the lens of this model,
distressed Eurozone countries were ‘stuck’ in the latter situation and therefore a simple, credible cap on
the market rate would be enough to rule out this sub-optimal equilibrium. However, during a dynamic
panic, the sovereign is always borrowing on the left side of this ‘Laffer curve’, even during a crisis, since
it can freely choose its debt level and would never place itself on the Pareto-dominated right side.4 Thus,
an interest rate ceiling in this environment is isomorphic to a revenue cap on debt issuance and will only
reduce government consumption and increase the likelihood of default.
Even though rate ceilings are ineffective, I do find that the provision of liquidity, which I interpret to
be a policy that the ECB undertook in its OMT program, was effective. In providing liquidity, the central
bank credibly pledges to purchase sovereign debt at potentially sub-market rates. The model suggests
that such a policy is effective at removing sentiment fluctuations, but that its welfare consequences are
ambiguous. This is because dynamic panics will not be a randomization over fundamental multiplicity, and
thus there may not be a ‘good’ regime on which to coordinate. As a consequence, the regimes induced by
a dynamic panic may look radically different in terms of their debt levels, default frequencies, and average
spreads, than an alternative fundamental equilibrium that does not act on sentiment dynamics.
This welfare trade-off can be understood in the context of the debate between the core and the periph-
ery: The periphery wants the central bank to provide liquidity to protect them from malignant market
sentiments, while the core fears that with such a backstop the periphery will rack up unsustainable debt
4For a graphical illustration of this, refer to Figure 5.
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levels and bring about more frequent fundamental crises. Both channels are active in the model. Under
some non-trivial regularity assumptions, it can be demonstrated that the key to the welfare consequences
of such a policy are the correlation of confidence with the re-entry shock following a default-induced period
of exclusion: If market sentiment is high upon re-entry, then the low-spreads equilibrium corresponding to
the mid-2000s is sustainable and the policy is likely welfare-improving; however, if market sentiment is low
upon re-entry, then the low spreads of the mid-2000s did not constitute a sustainable equilibrium. Given
In summary, this paper makes the following points: First, it outlines a new dynamic lender coordination
problem, which is the susceptibility of the standard sovereign debt environment to dynamic panics; second,
it generates borrowing into high spreads endogenously in the context of an already canonical model; third, it
demonstrates that interest rate ceilings would be an ineffective policy in combating such crises; and fourth,
it highlights the trade-off faced in the provision of liquidity and argues that, conditional on observed
spreads, this policy was likely welfare-improving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the relevant literature. In Section 3,
I construct a simple model in which dynamic panics are completely characterizable and driven by default
alone and explore their basic properties. In Section 4, I augment the simple model until it resembles a
canonical model of endogenous sovereign default, which is augmented to allow for sentiment dynamics. I
contrast the sort of panics that can arise in this model with those in the simple model, focusing on the
possibility for panics to be driven by excessive borrowing by virtue of the long-term nature of the debt.
I then explore several necessary features of dynamic panics in this environment and their relationship to
the Eurozone crisis as well as impact of several plausible policies designed to counter such panics. Section
5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
This paper contributes to several different strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the quan-
titative literature outlining the dynamics of sovereign debt and default episodes. This literature takes
the seminal framework of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and applies it quantitatively to primarily Latin
American economies to match business cycle statistics and the empirical regularities of developing nations.
Noteworthy papers in this vein include Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008). There is a nice
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summary of this tradition in Aguiar and Amador (2014).
This literature has also developed a branch that explicitly considers debt of longer maturities, of which
prominent examples include Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), and Arel-
lano and Ramanarayanan (2012). The lesson from this branch is that, apart from expected default, the
movements in the expected future price of the debt can have a significant impact on spreads today. This
effect has been called ‘dilution risk’, and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) show that it accounts for a
substantial fraction of long-term spreads. Dilution risk will feature prominently in my exploration of
non-default-relevant dynamic panics.
The framework developed by this literature has also been the benchmark for a string of recent applied
work studying default episodes. This is in large part because of the tractability of the assumption of
Markov-Perfection. Some prominent examples include Mendoza and Yue (2012), Gornemann (2014), Sa-
lomao (2014), and Na et al. (2014), who study respectively the impact of default on international private
lines of credit, long-term growth, credit default swaps, and optimal devaluation policy.
A common thread in this tradition is the lack of multiplicity or self-fulfilling dynamics. In this class of
models, default is always driven by an unfortunate sequence of fundamental shocks and often the underlying
equilibrium is unique. This uniqueness result was recently formalized by Auclert and Rognlie (2014). A
recent exception is Passadore and Xandri (2014), who find sufficient conditions under which multiplicity
of equilibria can exist for the case of short-term debt and use these conditions to bound the impact of
sunspot activity. This paper will have a similar goal, but will focus primarily on the recursive dynamics
of sunspot activity itself rather than its bounds. It also explores the interaction of sunspot activity with
the unique features of long-term debt.
This paper also contributes to the recent literature on the Eurozone. As of yet, the academic literature
has had little time to keep pace with developments that took place in the Eurozone over the past 6
years or so. However, several noteworthy pieces have emerged that have tried to deal seriously with the
peculiar circumstances surrounding the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. These papers have been
both empirical and structural. On the empirical side, recent work has taken aim at demonstrating the
confidence-driven nature of this crises by documenting an unusually weak correlation between economic
fundamentals and CDS spreads. Some prominent examples include De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and Aizenman
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et al. (2013). This work will rely in some sense on these empirical findings in its placement of malignant
market sentiments at the heart of the story in its theory of the crisis.
On the structural side, much emphasis has been placed on the unusual phenomenon of borrowing into
high spreads and its concomitant drastic effect on debt-to-GDP ratios. Conesa and Kehoe (2012) have
termed this phenomenon ‘gambling for redemption,’ and have argued that being mired in a deep recession
is a necessary condition for such behavior. Broner et al. (2014) and Corsetti and Dedola (2013) have also
built models featuring borrowing into high spreads. The former emphasizes the crowding out effect of
sovereign debt issuance when there is domestic preference for debt and the latter argues that the access
to liquidity that the central bank provides is more important for preventing such crises than the printing
press.
To the author’s knowledge, the only others that have highlighted the role of dynamic coordination
problems in the recent Eurozone crisis are Lorenzoni and Werning (2013). These authors also argue for
a Laffer-curve type multiplicity in the spirit of Calvo (1988), but with the explicit inclusion of long-term
debt. In their environment, as in mine, a dynamic lender coordination failure can place the economy on
a malignant trajectory of high spreads and debt ratios. They term such a crisis a ‘slow-moving’ crisis.
The key difference between their paper and mine is that I place more structure on the coordination failure
itself and give it the form of a persistent sunspot. This allows me to explore the possibility of such crises
in the standard Eaton-Gersovitz framework in which the government can commit to a level of debt as well
as to a level of revenue. This small difference has important policy implications. For instance, in their
environment, an interest rate ceiling would be an effective tool at alleviating slow-moving crises, while in
mine such a policy will tend to induce more default.
3. Simple Model
3.1. Environment
In this section I construct a simple sovereign debt environment in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and Arellano (2008) but with no intrinsic uncertainty and then characterize completely how the
model reacts to non-fundamental confidence. In the subsequent section I will relax many of the restrictive
assumptions and explore quantitatively how a richer, more standard model reacts to confidence shocks.
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Specifically, I will explore how sentiment fluctuations can generate borrowing panics and the key model
features required to do so.
For now, consider an infinitely-lived sovereign borrower that receives a constant endowment, y, in each
period. This sovereign has an increasing flow utility, u(·), over consumption in each period and discounts
the future at a rate β < 1. The only uncertainty in this model is extrinsic confidence, ξ, which can take one
of two values, {ξL, ξH}. I assume that ξ follows a symmetric Markov process with transition probability
η.5
He has a constant stock of debt, b, and he can either choose to roll over that debt at an exogenously
given price, q, which may depend on the level of confidence. If he does not roll over this debt, then he
defaults on it. He makes this default decision as soon as the extrinsic uncertainty is realized i.e. before he
goes to the auction to roll over his debt. When he defaults, he is excluded from credit markets forever and
pays a constant additive cost φ(y) in every subsequent period. I will restrict attention to equilibria that
are Markov-Perfect in confidence, and so we can write his Bellman equation, conditional on repayment, as
follows:
V (ξ) = u(y − b+ q(ξ)b) + βEξ˜|ξ[max{V (ξ˜), X}] (1)
where X, which is the value of default, can be computed as follows:
X = u(y − φ(y)) + βX
Notice that because there is no re-entry the value of X is independent of any particular equilibrium. Hence,
it is not an equilibrium object. The sovereign will borrow from a unit mass of risk-neutral, deep-pocketed
lenders with an outside option with return R. These lenders price default risk according to a no-arbitrage
condition, so in equilibrium the price must be given by:





Eξ˜|ξ[1{V (ξ˜) ≥ X}] (2)
We are now ready to define an equilibrium in our simple environment. In particular, a Markov-Perfect
Equilibrium will be a pair of functions {V (ξ), q(ξ)} such that
1. Given q(ξ), the value function V (ξ) solves Recursion 1
2. Given V (ξ), the pricing function q(ξ) solves Recursion 2
I will call a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium a Fundamental Markov-Perfect Equilibrium if in it confi-
dence has no real effects. If confidence does have real effects, I will call the Markov-Perfect Equilibrium a
Confidence-Waves Equilibrium. In a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium, a shift from ξH to ξL will be a
Dynamic Panic.
3.2. Characterizing Confidence-Waves Equilibria
In this simple environment, it is possible to make analytic statements regarding the entire set of
Confidence-Waves Equilibria. In particular, the following theorem can be established:
Theorem 3.1. The set of parameters over which a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium exists is completely
















Proof See Appendix A
Theorem 3.1 provides a set of both necessary and sufficient conditions for the potential for sentiment
dynamics in this simple model of sovereign default.6 The first condition will ensure that repayment is
optimal for some value of ξ = ξH without loss of generality. The second condition ensures that, in
addition, default is optimal in ξL. Since there is no other source of uncertainty, this is the only way in
6Note that we cannot say that such conditions are absolutely necessary for sunspot activity since, as I will show, non-sunspot equilibria will
also exist for these same parameterizations.
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which confidence can have real effects in a Markov-Perfect and thus these conditions completely characterize
the conditions necessary for sunspot activity.
From these conditions, we can derive several useful corollaries that highlight key model elements required
for confidence to have a real impact. The first is that confidence must be persistent.
Corollary 3.2. In any Confidence-Waves Equilibrium, η < 1/2.
Proof See Appendix A
Why must confidence be persistent? When default is driven by market sentiment, it must be that
high spreads themselves cause the default and low spreads themselves cause repayment. However, spreads
reflect anticipated default in the future, not contemporaneous default.
Suppose that we were trying to establish an equilibrium in which default only occurred in the face
of low confidence. If confidence was transient, then high confidence today would imply that quite likely
default would occur tomorrow. But this would drive down the price of debt today relative to the low
confidence state. Since the price discrepancy can be the sole driver of default discrepancies, this would
induce default in the high-confidence state instead of the low confidence state, which is a contradiction.
Thus, if confidence has real effects, it must be persistent.
So confidence must be persistent. But there is another important characteristic about the sovereign
debt environment that is not immediately obvious. It is summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.3. Let Θ(u) be the set of parameters for which a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium exists given
a utility function, u. If uˆ is more concave than u, then Θ(u) ⊆ Θ(uˆ).
Proof See Appendix A
In words, any parameterization for which a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium exists will continue to do
so as you increase the degree of risk-aversion of the sovereign. Further, the set of parameters over which
confidence fluctuations can occur expands with the degree of risk-aversion. Why is this? It is because a
more concave utility functions will punish a repaying sovereign in utility terms more severely when debt
service costs are expensive and thus when consumption is low. This will occur when confidence is low.
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This punishment must be severe enough such that default is optimal even though there is some probability
of re-entering the high-confidence, no-default regime.
3.2.1. Relationship to Rollover Crises and Multiplicity
An easy misinterpretation of Theorem 3.1 is that I am simply finding conditions for a ‘rollover crisis’
as in Cole and Kehoe (1996). This is not at all what I am describing here. During a rollover crisis, an
individual investor fears that other investors will not show up to the auction to roll over the sovereign’s
short-term debt. If the sovereign defaults in response, then the investors’ fears are justified and they do
not show up.
This is not what is going on with my dynamic panics. First, this is because the timing is different:
The default decision occurs prior to the sovereign’s debt auction. Thus, lenders cannot experience such a
contemporaneous coordination failure in my set-up. Second, lenders in my set-up are not panicking about
the behavior of other lenders today; rather, they are panicking about the behavior of lenders tomorrow.
Because the sentiment shock is persistent, when it is shocked today, lenders anticipate that lenders tomor-
row will offer a low price, which will induce default tomorrow. This fear induces them to offer a low price
today, which in turn induces default today. It is for this reason that I call my confidence crises dynamic
panics, since the intertmporal dimension is crucial.
This is formalized in the following corollary. During a rollover crisis, the equilibrium price of debt, q,
equals zero i.e. the sovereign cannot raise any revenue at the auction. However, during a dynamic panic
the price of debt falls, but it is not zero.
Corollary 3.4. During a dynamic panic, debt can be auctioned at q(ξL) > 0.
Thus, unlike a rollover crisis, it is possible to raise revenues at auctions; it is simply sub-optimal to do so.
The last necessary condition I will discuss is the relationship of Confidence-Waves Equilibria to multi-
plicity. In particular, we can claim the following:
Corollary 3.5. If a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium exist, then the full-default and full-repayment equilib-
rium both exist as well.
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Proof See Appendix A
This finding accords with the recent findings of Passadore and Xandri (2014), who find that multiplicity
is a necessary pre-condition to sunspot activity. In other words, there must be some room for strate-
gic complementarities of the sort that would induce multiple equilibria in order for a Confidence-Waves
Equilibrium to exist.
This is not to say that Confidence-Waves Equilibria are simply randomizing over existing multiplicity.
While this is one way that they can be generated, it is also possible that the sunspot is randomizing over
pricing schedules that are not themselves equilibria. In Appendix A I provide an analytic example of such
a case when there is some intrinsic uncertainty as well.
This result is similar in kind to that of Gottardi and Kajii (1999), who argue that sunspots need
not randomize over existing multiplicity, but only over ‘potential multiplicity’. They define to potential
multiplicity to be the existence of multiple equilibria for a reallocation of endowments. In my set-up,
such ‘potential multiplicity’ arises if there exist pricing schedules and default strategies that are close to
satisfying the equilibrium conditions. Confidence fluctuations can randomize over these schedules even
though they themselves are not equilibria.
4. Full Model
In this section I will describe a model of sovereign debt and default that subsumes several of the standard
quantitative sovereign default models in the literature. I then explore the potential for dynamic panics
in these already standard models and characterize several of their necessary features, honing in on the
capacity of sentiment shocks to generate borrowing panics.
This model will be a superset of Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), which in turn subsumes the influen-
tial model of Arellano (2008). In particular, there will be intrinsic as well as extrinsic uncertainty. There
will also be an endogenous borrowing choice and debt of longer maturities.
4.1. Environment
The theoretical model will allow for three stochastic processes: A fundamental endowment shock, y ∈ Y ,
a continuous, fundamental subsistence consumption level shock, m˜ ∈ [
¯
m, m¯], and a non-fundamental
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confidence shock, ξ ∈ Ξ. Both the endowment and the confidence shocks are assumed to be persistent and
Y and Ξ are assumed to be discrete sets. In particular, I assume that confidence is binary i.e. ξ ∈ {ξL, ξH}
and that there is a symmetric transition probability, η < 1/2. The preference shock, m˜, is assumed to be
iid over time and will therefore not impact the price in equilibrium. Its continuous nature, however, will
smooth over the discrete nature of sovereign’s decisions in expectation, which helps both with existence
and computation. Its range is assumed to be fairly small.
The sovereign borrower chooses a level of consumption, c, how much to borrow from abroad, b′ ∈ B,
and whether or not to default. It is assumed that every element in B is non-negative and that 0 ∈ B. He
receives a flow utility, u(·) from consumption, which I assume is increasing and strictly concave. Debt is
long-term and matures stochastically at a rate λ; in each period that it does not mature it pays a coupon
κ.
I will focus on Markov-Perfect Equilibria and so I can write the sovereign’s problem recursively. Taking
as given the demand schedule for its debt from foreign investors, q(y, ξ, b′), the government solves the
following Bellman, which is conditional on repayment this period:
V (y, ξ,m, b) = max
c≥0,b′∈B
u(c−m) + βV(y, ξ, b′) (3)
s.t. c ≤ y − [λ+ (1− λ)κ]b+ q(y, ξ, b′)[b′ − (1− λ)b]
I assume that if the sovereign faces an empty budget set, he must default. The continuation value allows
for default is ex-post optimal, and is thus given by
V(y, ξ, b′) = E(y˜,ξ˜,m˜)|(y,ξ)[max{V (y˜, ξ˜, m˜, b′), X(y˜)}]
I will denote the sovereign’s borrowing policy function to be a(y, ξ,m, b).
I assume that when the country defaults, it is excluded from credit markets temporarily. It will suffer
some additive output loss, φ(y), in each period of this exclusion. It re-enters stochastically at a rate
piRE and it does so with a deterministic level of confidence ξ¯, after which confidence follows its typical
Markov-process. This assumption helps solidify the representation of ξ as confidence, since presumably
confidence is highly correlated with the re-entry shock, though it is not entirely clear in which direction
that correlation goes. It may be that creditors are leery of a defaulter’s return to credit markets and
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confidence is low; this would accord with the findings of Ozler (1993), who finds that borrowing costs tend
to be higher for defaulters upon re-entry. Alternatively, it may be the case that the simple fact that lenders
are now willing to lend to the sovereign again reflects a positive shift in sentiment. Which story is true
will have important theoretical and policy consequences, as I will outline later.
Notice that this assumption will imply that the default value is independent of ξ even though ξ remains
non-fundamental. This feature will be important both computationally and theoretically. Also upon
re-entry, it is assumed to have no debt obligations.7
Under these assumptions, we can express the value of default as
X(y) = u(y − φ(y)− m¯) + βEy˜,m˜|y[(1− piRE)X(y˜ − [
¯
m− m˜]) + piREV (y˜, ξ¯, m˜, 0)] (4)
Notice that, as in Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), during the first period of default the sovereign faces
the worst m˜ shock but experiences it as its normal stochastic process thereafter.
I assume that the sovereign borrows from a unit mass of short-lived, risk-neutral, deep-pocketed lenders
that price default and dilution risk against some asset with a risk-free return, R. These lenders care
about the endowment and confidence level today, since these objects provide information regarding their
distribution tomorrow, and the level of borrowing today, b′, since indebtedness will also provide information
regarding the default frequency tomorrow. Since the debt is long-term, they also care about the expected
future price of their debt and thus about the degree to which the sovereign borrows tomorrow. The pricing
recursion thus becomes





1{V (y˜, ξ˜, m˜, b′) ≥ X(y˜)} × [λ+ (1− λ)(κ+ q(y˜, ξ˜, a(y˜, ξ˜, m˜, b′)))]] (5)
4.1.1. Equilibrium Definition
A Markov-Perfect Equilibrium is a set of functions V (y, ξ,m, b), a(y, ξ,m, b), X(y), and q(y, ξ, b′)
such that
1. V (y, ξ,m, b) satisfies Recursion 3 when given X(y) and q(y, ξ, b′) and implies the borrowing policy
function a(y, ξ,m, b)
7This last assumption can be relaxed to allow for haircuts provided we restrict attention to the set of equilibria for which default incentives are
increasing in the level of debt, which is a benign and plausible restriction.
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2. X(y) satisfies Recursion 4 when given V (y, ξ,m, b)
3. q(y, ξ, b′) solves Recursion 5 given V (y, ξ,m, b), X(y), and a(y, ξ,m, b)
A Confidence-Waves Equilibrium is a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in which either V (y, ξL,m, b) 6=
V (y, ξH ,m, b), a(y, ξL,m, b) 6= a(y, ξH ,m, b), or q(y, ξL, b) 6= q(y, ξH , b) for some (y,m, b) in the fundamental
state space. In other words, a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium is a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in which
sentiment shocks matter. A Dynamic Panic is defined to be a transition from ξH to ξL in the context
of a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium, since such a panic will represent a shift in lender sentiment regarding
the behavior of future lenders.
4.2. Theoretical Results
In what follows I characterize the theoretical properties of Confidence-Waves Equilibria. In particular, I
will show that dynamic panics at longer maturities exhibit several features peculiar to the Eurozone crisis,
including excessive persistence and borrowing into high spreads. Because of this, I explore several policy
implications of long-term dynamic panics and discuss briefly their applicability to the Eurozone crisis.
The first result tells us that confidence shocks are indeed an equilibrium phenomenon: Both lenders
and the sovereign must actively respond to the shock in order for them to have any real effects:
Proposition 4.1. Let d(y, ξL,m, b) denote the default policy of the sovereign. In any CW Equilibrium,
both of the following must hold
1. ∃(y,m, b) such that either d(y, ξL,m, b) 6= d(y, ξH ,m, b) or a(y, ξL,m, b) 6= a(y, ξH ,m, b)
2. ∃(y, b′) such that q(y, ξL, b′) 6= q(y, ξH , b′)
Proof See Appendix A
Having established the equilibrium nature of these sentiment shocks, I now begin to characterize them
by defining a new term:
Definition A Confidence-Waves Equilibrium is Default-Relevant if the realization of ξ matters for the
default decision of the sovereign at some point in the fundamental state space.
14
In other words, if the equilibrium is default-relevant then there is a fundamental state for which the
sovereign defaults when confidence is low and repays when confidence is high. It is possible to have an
equilibrium that is non-default-relevant even though m˜ is continuously distributed provided that the range
of m˜ is fairly small. I will provide an example momentarily.
With this definition in hand, we can distinguish how maturity will influence the underlying impact of
confidence.
Proposition 4.2. If the debt is short-term i.e. λ = 1, κ = 0, then any Confidence-Waves Equilibrium
must be default-relevant.
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 4.2 tells us that if the sunspot has any real effects, it must at some point make the difference
between the sovereign defaulting and repaying. This proposition disappears when we extend the maturity
of the debt. It will still be the case that default-relevance is sufficient to have an active sunspot, but it
will no longer be necessary, since the sunspot can affect the future price of the debt if it affects borrowing
behavior.
So how can we have a non-default-relevant dynamic panic? There are essentially two components:
Investors’ pricing of dilution and sovereign excessive borrowing. For intuition, suppose that the path of
primary deficits is taken as given. During a non-default-relevant dynamic panic, investors today anticipate
aggressive borrowing tomorrow, which dilutes the price of long-term debt today. Since debt prices are
lower today, additional borrowing is required to fill the same primary deficit. But since the sovereign has
borrowed more today, he will have more to roll over tomorrow and thus borrow more tomorrow, justifying
lenders’ fears of dilution. This intuition holds up even when the sovereign is allowed to optimally choose
the path of primary deficits i.e. it is more costly for him to change alter this path than it is to reduce the
elevated risk of default.
The sovereign cannot escape the impact of these sentiment shocks because investors are afraid not of
contemporaneous borrowing behavior, but future borrowing behavior, and he lacks the ability to commit
to borrowing in the future, just as he lacks the ability to commit to repayment.
Figure 1 demonstrates the intuition. With longer term debt lenders care not only about whether the
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sovereign defaults tomorrow, but about the future price of the debt. Thus, if lenders in period t anticipate
lenders in t+1 to panic, it need not be the case that default probabilities actually rise in t+1, since lenders
in t already care about the price of debt in t + 1. But Proposition 4.1 tells us that the sovereign must
respond somehow to this shock, even though he does not change his default behavior. Thus, he changes his
borrowing behavior, and in particular he must borrow in the face of a panic to justify the panic occurring
in the first place. He borrows more today to fill the same primary deficit at higher spreads and is expected

















Figure 1: Non-Default-Relevant Dynamic Panics: An Illustration
Thus, non-default-relevant dynamic panics are a way for sentiments to have real effects without ever
impacting directly the default decision of the sovereign. Rather, they alter the distribution over future
fundamental defaults by increasing sovereign indebtedness through excessive borrowing. This additional
indebtedness justifies lenders fears, which are of dilution risk.
In a sense, a non-default-relevant dynamic panic is the opposite of an investor ‘run’ as in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) or Rodrik and Velasco (1999). Investors in such a panic do not fear that investors tomorrow
will withdraw lending from the sovereign. They are afraid of quite the reverse i.e. that lenders tomorrow
will lend excessively to the sovereign, which will drive down the expected future price of the debt. Since
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long-term bondholders care about this future price, they too will panic and demand higher spreads.
Although the causal chain of a long-term dynamic panic is driven by borrowing, in equilibrium we
will simply have two different regimes: One in which spreads, default probabilities, and borrowing are
all low and another in which all of these objects are high. The only time this will not be true is in the
period of the initial panic itself, since here default probabilities will not increase, though spreads and
borrowing will. This can be seen in the numerical example provided in Figure 2.8 This example shows
how a non-default-relevant dynamic panic can affect borrowing and pricing behavior. In particular, we get
two distinct pricing and borrowing regimes: One in which low borrowing occurs at low spreads and one in
which high borrowing occurs at high spreads.
Notice that in Figure 2 that the demand schedules across panic and non-panic states are very similar
for high levels of debt. This is because these far right portions of the demand curve reflect immediate
default risk, which does not change across confidence states when the equilibrium is non-default-relevant.
However, there is a substantial difference in the pricing schedules with regards to low debt levels. This is
because debt prices at low levels don’t reflect immediate default risk but rather dilution risk: Lenders are
concerned about the future trajectory of sovereign borrowing, which will be necessarily be higher during a
panic than not.
Further, we can see from a simulation path in Figure 3 that a regime change is associated with higher
levels of borrowing.9 Figure 3 compares the spreads and consumption paths of two sample economies
which face the same endowment shocks. The first economy does not respond to non-fundamental activity
and the second economy is in a confidence-waves equilibrium, experiencing a dynamic panic. One can see
that when the confidence falls, it immediately and substantially increases spreads; by a factor of about
two in this example. However, consumption changes very little; in other words, the sovereign undergoes
little to no fiscal consolidation in response to this shock. Rather, he borrows more from abroad to fill the
budgetary gap. This is seen in Figure 4, which plots the response of the debt level to the same sequence
8To calibrate these examples, I simply use the parameterization of Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) and add a large but non-binding subsistence
level of consumption to induce greater absolute risk-aversion in the flow utility function, which is assumed to be CRRA. Increased risk-aversion
increases the utility cost of high sentiment-driven spreads and thus increases responsiveness of the sovereign in terms of borrowing and default
behavior to such spread shocks.
9Notice that both spreads and debt ratios are contemporaneous. High confidence-driven spreads induce excessive borrowing in the next period
while high fundamental-driven spreads induce deleveraging in the following period.
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Figure 2: Demand Functions in a Long-Term Dynamic Panic (Non-Default-Relevant)
of shocks as Figure 4.
I will address the optimality of excessive sovereign borrowing in a moment, but before I do I will define
one more term to describe the sort of panic outlined in this quantitative model.
Definition A dynamic panic is monotone at y if for every b′ ∈ B we have that q(y, ξH , b′) ≥ q(y, ξL, b′).
There are numerous necessary features of monotone, non-default-relevant dynamics panics that formal-
ize the intuition just outlined. I will now outline each of them in turn.
Proposition 4.3. If, in a non-default-relevant Confidence-Waves Equilibrium, the dynamic panic is mono-
tone at some yˆ ∈ Y, then there is a subset of fundamental states, S ⊂ Y×M×B such that if (y,m, b) ∈ S,
we must have that
a(y, ξH ,m, b) < a(y, ξL,m, b)
In these states, future default frequencies must rise.
Proof See Appendix A
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Figure 3: Simulation of a Long-Term Dynamic Panic (Non-Default-Relevant)
This behavior of borrowing into high spreads is a necessary condition of non-default-relevant long-term
dynamic panics. The sovereign has three options in the face of an adverse shock: Default, delever, or
borrow into the spreads. This third option, in which little to no domestic fiscal adjustment takes place,
is a requirement to generate non-default-relevant dynamic panics, since this is the only response that
justifies the lender panic. This is one of the key features of such panics that I will utilize in my structural
estimation.
But why would such excessive borrowing behavior be the optimal response of the sovereign? The reason
is twofold. First, at longer maturities, the amount of debt that needs to be rolled over at panic spreads
will be lower than it will be for shorter maturities; thus, such panic borrowing is on average less costly.
Second, the typical default-risk channel that generates overly volatile consumption is absent without
default-relevance. To understand why, consider what usually happens in response to an adverse funda-
mental shock in period t in the style of Arellano (2008). Such a shock has two consequences: First, it
reduces income in period t, generating a borrowing motive; and second, it increases default risk in period
t+1, which in equilibrium raises interest rates and generates a saving or delevering motive. In quantitative
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Figure 4: Simulation of a Long-Term Dynamic Panic (Non-Default-Relevant)
applications, this latter effect dominates and saving occurs in bad times, generating consumption volatility
that is greater than output volatility.
However, during a monotone, non-default-relevant confidence shock, default risk remains unchanged in
period t + 1; instead, it increases in periods t + 2, t + 3, . . . as a result of higher future borrowing. Thus,
the magnitude of the equilibrium rate effect is necessarily smaller for a confidence shock of this kind, and
so too is the saving motive. In equilibrium, it is necessarily dominated and higher borrowing occurs.
In practice, this result is far stronger than the fairly weak claim of this proposition: Such borrowing
into high spreads tends to happen in nearly every state of the world that is realized on the equilibrium
path. In fact, in the face of a panic the sovereign tends to not change his consumption or default behavior
at all and instead borrows additionally to fill the same primary deficit.
This result is quite striking upon reflection. It tells us that during a dynamic panic, the sovereign will
willfully increase his debt position and default probability. This stands in stark contrast to the behavior
sovereigns in such models as Cole and Kehoe (1996), in which case the sovereign either delevers or defaults
in response to the negative shock. The intuition behind this result is that the debt here is of longer maturity
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and therefore the average cost of new debt issuance, which is what is directly affected by the price, is not
nearly as high as it is for short-term debt, the stock of which the sovereign must roll over every period. It
is therefore much more willing to increase its debt position in the hopes of recovery.
4.2.1. Policy Implications
I now explore two new policy implications in this environment. The first is the efficacy of a rate ceiling.
Many authors, including Corsetti and Dedola (2013) and Lorenzoni and Werning (2013) have argued that
an interest rate ceiling could have been an effective tool in combating malignant market sentiments. The
reason is the following: A graph of revenue versus debt at any debt-auction ought to be parabolic since low
levels of debt with have high prices and thus raise revenue but high levels of debt will have lower prices due
to increased default probabilities and thus actually lower revenue. Some examples of such Laffer-curves
can be seen in Figure 5.
These authors follow Calvo (1988) in asserting that the confidence crisis experienced by the Eurozone
was a result of the sovereign winding up on the right-hand side of this Laffer-curve i.e. raising the same
amount of revenue but with higher debt and worse prices. In the presence of such a crisis, an interest rate
ceiling can be an effective tool since it forces the investors to coordinate on the good equilibrium on the
left-hand side of the Laffer curve.
This policy implication is lost when the crisis at hand is a dynamic panic and not a Calvo-style crisis,
as is made clear by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. During a dynamic panic, a binding interest rate ceiling is equivalent to a revenue cap
on debt issuance. Thus a binding, temporary interest rate ceiling will increase the probability of default.
Proof See Appendix A
There is an intuitive graphical exposition of Proposition 4.4 in Figure 5. The black line represents the
debt cap imposed by the rate ceiling. Consider the level of revenue raised by the horizontal dashed line.
The typical Calvo-style multiplicity dictates that the sovereign is on the far-right intersection with the
blue curve, and thus a rate ceiling such as this forces investors to coordinate back on the good equilibrium







Figure 5: Laffer-Curves: Non-crisis (Blue) and Crisis (Red)
However, during a dynamic panic, we are not on the right side of the blue curve; we are in fact on
the left side of a new red curve that implies less revenue raised for any given level of debt. The debt cap
imposed by the black line then simply implies a revenue cap. Given this revenue cap, consumption must
drop in the case of repayment and so repayment becomes less attractive and default frequencies rise.
It is important to note that an interest rate ceiling is different than the arguably successful measures
that the ECB took to avert the crisis such as the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) bond-buying
program. As noted by Corsetti and Dedola (2013), these programs were note rate ceilings but guarantees
that the ECB would purchase government debt at sub-market interest rates. I follow De Grauwe (2011)
in calling such a policy liquidity provision. The next proposition demonstrates that in fact such a policy
may be effective.
Proposition 4.5. Liquidity provision can eliminate the impact of confidence fluctuations without the need
to actually purchase any assets. The resulting economy will still suffer from a weakly positive probability
of default driven by the problem of limited commitment.
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 4.5 tells us that the ECB can in fact judiciously provide liquidity to eliminate the impact
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of malignant market sentiments, as they effectively did with the OMT Program. Such a policy does not
actually require a purchasing of the debt, so long as the implied demand schedule is consistent with an
equilibrium not subject to confidence fluctuations.
The proposition also tells us that under the resulting economy will continue to suffer from a weakly
positive probability of default. This is actually a fairly accurate description of the OMT program, which did
not provide unconditional liquidity, but required that certain sustainability measures be met. Wolf (2014)
highlights that this aspect of the program drew criticism from its opponents, since it would presumably
not be there to provide liquidity precisely when member countries needed it most: During a crisis. My
modelling choice for liquidity provision allows for precisely such a crisis to occur while simultaneously
eliminating the direct impact of sentiment fluctuations.
It is clear from the above proposition that the central bank can eliminate confidence fluctuations, but
it is less clear if it would want to. Provision of liquidity in this sense can essentially costlessly shift the
economy from an equilibrium with sunspot activity to one without. However, it is not clear a priori that
the equilibrium without sunspots is better than its sunspots counterpart. To make a welfare statement
one way or the other will require some knowledge of the relationship of Confidence-Waves Equilibria to
underlying multiplicity. Unfortunately for the policy-maker, the regimes over which the sunspot random-
izes are not both themselves equilibria. It turns out that at most one of them is. This result is formalized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.6. Either limη→0 q(y, ξL, b′) is an equilibrium pricing schedule or limη→0 q(y, ξH , b′) is an
equilibrium pricing schedule, but not both.
Proof See Appendix A.
This result tells us that either the panic regime or the high confidence regime is close to an equilibrium,
but not both. The result follows from the assumption that the confidence shock is perfectly correlated with
the re-entry shock. The two pricing regimes will be converge to what may at first appear to be distinct
equilibria, but they must share a common value of default. This default value can be associated with at
most one equilibrium, and so the other pricing schedule most not be an equilibrium.
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This result has a very useful corollary that helps clarify the consequences of liquidity provision:
Corollary 4.7. Suppose that we have a set of non-default-relevant Confidence-Waves Equilibria that are
monotone for all y ∈ Y as well as continuous in η. If ξ¯ = ξH , then the provision of liquidity can return
the economy to an equilibrium with lower spreads than the high-confidence regime.
This result tells us that for a certain class of equilibria, those that are continuous in η and monotone for
all y, the consequences of liquidity provision depend critically on expectations regarding investor confidence
in the re-entry following a default. In particular, if high investor confidence is associated with re-entry,
then it will be the case that the central bank can essentially shift the economy back to a regime that is
even better than the high-confidence state; however, if low investor confidence is associated with re-entry,
then providing liquidity in this way will only worsen the panic, since the only sustainable regime is the
panic.
Corollary 4.7 does not necessarily imply that the provision of liquidity is welfare-improving: This is
because in states of the world where the sovereign wishes to delever and repurchase debt, it is more costly
for him to do since debt prices are high. In practice however, since these sovereign governments are myopic,
this tends to imply that the provision of liquidity is welfare-improving. Since we did see spreads fall on
impact in the European case, it is quite likely that in this case, ξ¯ = ξH ,
10 and thus the provision of liquidity
was likely welfare-improving in this context.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I characterized a new type of dynamic lender coordination problem, which I call dy-
namic panics. I demonstrated their existence in the standard quantitative sovereign debt model as well
as characterized their basic properties. In particular, I showed that they appear as true panics in the
sense of monotone price shifts, and that their existence implies that the uniqueness result associated with
fundamental Markov-perfection is a fragile one. I also show that such panics can affect both long-term and
short-term debt, but if they affect short-term debt it must at some point act through the default channel.
10If ξ¯ = ξL, we would have seen spreads rise mildly at the announcement in 2012 rather than fall drastically.
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However, with long-term debt we can have crises driven solely by borrowing behavior, which I argue oc-
curred in the Eurozone periphery. I further demonstrated that in this environment interest rate ceilings
are ineffective but that liquidity provision can eliminate the malignant impact of market sentiments.
This paper lays the groundwork for much potential future research. First and foremost, there is a clear
need to take this mechanism to Eurozone data in a serious way. In Stangebye (2015) I attempt this with
an auxiliary DSGE model with a unique equilibrium, but an exploration of the quantitative capacity of
true sentiment shocks to generate such crises is called for.
Further, I have only just begun to outline the theoretical properties of these confidence-waves and have
only been able to prove their existence for short-term debt, though computational examples with long-term
debt can be found. An existence theorem for the case of long-term debt would likely be quite enlightening.
In addition, the dynamic panics may have significantly broader implications than simply in sovereign
debt markets. There is no reason why we would not expect such panics in markets for, say, municipal debt
or commercial paper. A more in-depth exploration of the potential for dynamic panics in these markets
would also prove illuminating.
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Appendix A. Theoretical Proofs
Appendix A.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1
To characterize the set of Confidence-Waves Equilibria, note first that there is only one way that ξ
can have real effects: It must induce the sovereign to default in one state and repay in the other. If the
sovereign defaults in both states, then confidence has no effects; the same is true if the sovereign repays in
both states. Without loss of generality, let us search for an equilibrium in which the sovereign repays in
ξH and defaults in ξL.







If we impose the default strategy in the continuation value of the sovereign, then we can write the
Bellman of the sovereign conditional on repayment in ξH as follows:
V (ξH) = u
(




+ β [ηX + (1− η)V (ξH)]















)− u (y − φ(y))
1− β(1− η)
In order for default to be the optimal response, it will be both necessary and sufficient that M(ξH) ≥ 0.
This condition is precisely the first assumption under the assumption of an increasing utility function.
We will also require that V (ξL) − X = M(ξL) < 0 i.e. default is optimal in the low-confidence state.
This Bellman can be written as
V (ξL) = u
(




+ β [(1− η)X + ηV (ξH)]
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We can again take the difference with X to define M(ξL):
M(ξL) = u
(




− u (y − φ(y)) + βηM(ξH)
→M(ξL) = u
(













− u (y − φ(y))
]
This last expression will be will be strictly less than zero if and only if the second assumption holds. In
other words, the flow difference must be largely negative; enough so to compensate for the smaller but
positive continuation value difference.
The intuition here is that the cost of debt service is greater than the default costs when confidence is
low since debt prices are also very low. As such, it is no longer worthwhile to service the debt and default
becomes optimal. However, when confidence is high so are debt prices and so the cost of debt service is
now lower than default costs.
Thus, the two conditions in the theorem are both necessary and sufficient for the existence of Confidence-
Waves Equilibrium.
Appendix A.1.1. Proof of Corollary 3.2
To see why this persistence holds, note that the second assumption requires the following to be true
u (y − φ(y))− u
(







b− φ(y) > 0
i.e. the cost of debt service in the low confidence state is strictly greater than the default costs. If we take
the difference of this expression with the first assumption, we arrive at the result:





R− 1 + η −R + η < 0
η < 1/2
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Appendix A.1.2. Proof of Corollary 3.3
Notice first that in any Confidence-Waves Equilibrium, it must be that R−1+η
R
b ≤ φ(y) < R−η
R
b. If we
increase the concavity, then the utility difference between the first and second of these terms will increase
more than the utility difference between the utility difference between the second and third terms. But
this will imply that the second condition of Theorem 3.1 will continue to hold.
Notice, however, that this result does not hold if we make u more convex. In fact, some Confidence-
Waves Equilibria can disappear when this happens.
Appendix A.1.3. Proof of Corollary 3.5
First, let us find the conditions that govern the two non-sunspot equilibria: Full default and full repay-
ment. Under the assumption of full-default, the price must be 0 in equilibrium. If we insert default as the
optimal strategy in the continuation value, we derive the following Bellman:
V = u(y − b) + βX
If we take the difference of this value with X we arrive at
M = u(y − b)− u(y − φ(y))
We require that M < 0 in order for this to be an equilibrium, which will be true provided b > φ(y). Notice
that this is implied by our second assumption, which requires that
R− η
R
b− φ(y) > 0
→ b− φ(y) > 0
Thus, if a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium exists, so too does the full-default equilibrium.






















)− u(y − φ(y))
1− β
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We require that M ≥ 0 in order for this to be an equilibrium, which is true provided R−1
R
b ≤ φ(y). But this
follows direction from the first assumption which states that R−1+η
R
b ≤ φ(y). Thus, if a Confidence-Waves
Equilibrium exists, so too does the full-repayment equilibrium.
Appendix A.1.4. Sunspots Randomizing over Non-Equilibrium Pricing Schedules: An Ex-
ample
I provide a simple example here of a case in which sunspot activity can randomize over non-equilibrium
pricing schedules. This example demonstrates that the regimes to which sunspots transition may not
themselves be sustainable, which has important policy implications.
Consider again the simple model, but now suppose that u(c) = c and that there is some simple intrinsic
uncertainty as well. In particular, y ∈ {y1, y2} and changes regimes with probability p. Continue to
suppose that default costs can depend on y.
I now outline the conditions that define several non-sunspots equilibria. Using the techniques outlined










) ≥ 0 for both states, i.
We can also find conditions under which an alternative equilibrium exists: One in which repayment occurs
in y2 but default occurs in y1. This equilibrium can exist if and only if the following conditions hold:










b > φ(y1) +
βp
1−β(1−p)φ(y2)
Now that we have outlined tightly how two non-sunspots equilibria can arise(or not arise), I will show
how a sunspots equilibrium can randomize over these pricing schedules even if one of them is not an equi-
librium. In particular, we will search for a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium in which the following holds:
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V (ξ1, y1) < X(y1) ≤ V (ξ2, y1)
X(y2) ≤ V (ξ1, y2) ≤ V (ξ2, y2)
Thus, we are searching for a sunspots equilibrium in which the sunspot randomizes over the RF default
strategy and the INT default strategy. This pattern of default and repayment will suggest the following
pricing schedule:
q(ξ1, y1) =
p+ η − ηp
1 + r
q(ξ2, y1) =








Notice that, under sunspot persistence, the following is true:
q(y1) < q(ξ1, y1) < q(ξ2, y1) <
1
1 + r
q(y2) < q(ξ1, y2) < q(ξ2, y2) <
1
1 + r
where q(yi) is the price of an INT equilibrium (if it exists, which it may not). Thus the sunspot is
randomizing over these two regimes in which the sovereign follows either FR or INT.
In words, if this pricing schedule is an equilibrium, then it implies a welfare improvement over the
interior solution without confidence waves. This is because the overall probability of default has fallen,
since the sovereign does not always default in fundamental state 1. Even though it appears as if this might
be a convexification over the risk-free equilibrium and the interior one, we will show that it is not in a
moment.
To determine whether an sunspots equilibrium exists, define M ijk = V (ξi, yj)−X(yk). It is sufficient for






2 ≥ 0. Assuming the appropriate
default/repayment scheme in the continuation value, we can difference the Bellmans of the value and
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default functions to derive these objects as functions of themselves as follows:
M111 = φ(y1)−
1 + r − p− η + ηp
1 + r
b+ βη(1− p)M211 + βp[(1− η)M122 + ηM222 ]
M211 = φ(y1)−
r + η − ηp
1 + r
b+ β(1− η)(1− p)M211 + βp[ηM122 + (1− η)M222 ]
M122 = φ(y2)−
r + p− ηp
1 + r




b+ β(1− η)pM212 + β(1− p)[ηM122 + (1− η)M222 ]
The above is a linear system of four equations in four unknowns. The analytic solution to this system is
quite complicated and difficult to characterize (though feasible to find), but it is quite easy to determine
computationally the solution for simple parameter values.
Consider the following parameterization, but which satisfies Assumptions FR and INT2, but which








For varying values of η (non-fundamental persistence), we get the following differences. Recall that an
equilibrium exists if M111 < 0 and the rest are positive.
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Value of η 0.0 0.002 0.05
M111 -0.9703 -0.9681 -0.9507
M211 0.1310 0.0468 -0.6068
M122 -0.0138 0.0066 0.0372
M222 0.3582 0.3101 0.0646
We can see that, as assumed, when η = 0 and there is no switching, there is no equilibrium. Also, if η
is too large, we lose the equilibrium as well. However, for some persistent process e.g. η = 0.002, a CW
equilibrium does exist. Thus, in a sunspots equilibrium we can sustain a temporary pattern of default in
state 1 and repayment in state 2 even when this pattern of default is not itself an equilibrium.
This is possible because INT is close enough to satisfying the equilibrium conditions i.e. it is a ‘potential’
equilibrium. In particular, the value of repayment in the high state is just a bit too small to justify
repayment on its own. However, once we insert a sunspot that gives us the opportunity to jump back
into a more beneficial regime, the price of repayment in y2 increases enough to suddenly make repayment
worthwhile. Thus the non-equilibrium INT regime is a potential equilibrium and thus can be randomized
over in a sunspots equilibrium.
Appendix A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.1
This can be shown by contradiction. Suppose that we had a Confidence-Waves Equilibrium with a
pricing schedule that never depended on ξ. Once given the pricing schedule, the sovereign’s Bellman
equation becomes a contraction on V and X. Since the only channel through which ξ can affect the
sovereign’s payoff is through the price, the resulting, unique fixed point will not depend on fluctuations
in ξ. Thus, ξ would have no effect in equilibrium, which contradicts the fact that the equilibrium is a
Confidence-Waves Equilibrium.
The same argument holds if we suppose that sovereign behavior never depended on ξ, since the lenders’
pricing recursion is also a conditional contraction on q. Thus, any Confidence-Waves Equilibrium must
feature an active change of behavior on both sides of the market in response to sentiment shocks.
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Appendix A.3. Proof of Proposition 4.2
When the equilibrium is not default relevant, then for any (y,m, b), we will have either V (y, ξ,m, b) ≥














1{V (y˜, ξ˜, m˜, b′) ≥ X(y˜)}
]
→ q(y, ξ1, b′) = q(y, ξ0, b′) = q(y, b′)
and so the sunspot does not affect the price.
Appendix A.4. Proof of Proposition 4.3
First, note that under the restriction of Markov-Perfection, the default policy of the sovereign is increas-
ing in b,11 We know that, in equilibrium, the price schedule q must reflect default risk in all future periods,
not just the subsequent period. Further, since the equilibrium is non-default-relevant, we know that a
confidence-driven price discrepancy in period t does not reflect an difference in the default probabilities in
period t + 1. Thus, the confidence-driven price discrepancy must reflect increased default risk in periods
t+ 2, t+ 3, . . . . Since confidence never drives default, it must be the case that the distribution over fun-
damental states induced by ξL implies a higher default frequency than that induced by ξH . However, since
the distribution of future endowment realizations is identical across the two regimes, it must be the case
that debt levels are higher in some states of the world under ξL than ξH . Since confidence is persistent,
this must have been generated by strictly higher borrowing in ξL than ξH for some fundamental states in
the future, in particular, those states which are most likely.
Appendix A.5. Proof of Proposition 4.4
First, note that whether the economy is in a crisis or not the sovereign optimally borrows on the left-
hand side of the ‘Laffer curve’, which plots revenue against debt issuance. This is because the sovereign
can commit to not only to revenue raised at debt auctions, but also to the amount of debt issued. Thus,
given to issuance options yielding the same revenue, the sovereign will always choose the one with less
debt, since the value function is decreasing the level of debt.
11See Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) for a proof of this claim. Their results generalize to my environment.
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During a dynamic panic, the entire Laffer curve shifts but the sovereign continues to remain on the
left-hand side of it. Therefore, if we implement a binding interest-rate ceiling, it will necessarily lower the
quantity of debt that can be issued. This is because the demand curve for debt is downsloping12, so a
price floor (rate ceiling) translates directly to a ceiling on debt issuance. A ceiling on debt issuance also
places a ceiling on the revenue that can be raised, since the sovereign is located on an upsloping portion
of the Laffer curve. Since the ceiling is temporary, tomorrow the sovereign can expect to resume with the
equilibrium dynamics.
Denote the value of the sovereign who faces the original equilibrium demand functions with an interest
rate ceiling as Vˆ (y, ξ,m, b′). Note that since Vˆ (y, ξ,m, b′) is the objective function of the same maximization
as V (y, ξ,m, b′) but with an additional constraint, specifically one on revenue, we will necessarily have
Vˆ (y, ξ,m, b′) ≤ V (y, ξ,m, b′). Therefore, the probability of default has risen.
Appendix A.6. Proof of Proposition 4.5
This result follows because, ignoring the non-fundamental ξ, the model becomes isomorphic to the
model of Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012). Thus, the existence result they provide for long-term debt
without confidence fluctuations still holds. Denote this equilibrium price of debt to be q(y, b′).
The European Central Bank can pledge liquidity by guaranteeing to purchase debt at a schedule q(y, b′)
for the foreseeable future. If it does so, it will induce the sovereign to adopt the policy rules from the
equilibrium free of confidence shifts. When this happens, investors will lend to the sovereign at the price
q(y, b′), since it is in fact an equilibrium price, and the ECB never actually has to purchase the debt.
Appendix A.7. Proof of Proposition 4.6
To see this result, first notice that since the equilibria are continuous in η, we will have two limiting
pricing schedules: qL(y, b
′) = limη→0 q(y, ξL, b′) and qH(y, b′) = limη→0 q(y, ξH , b′). Now, if ξ¯ = ξL, then by
continuity in η it must be the case that the equilibrium conditions are satisfied at qL(y, b
′), VL(y,m, b),
and XL(y), the latter two being the implied sovereign value functions (since, conditional on the pricing
schedule, the sovereign’s problem is a contraction).
12See Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) for a proof of this.
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However, it cannot be the case that qH is part of a distinct equilibrium. This is because a distinct
equilibrium would entail that XL(y) 6= XH(y), but we since the equilibrium valuation of default does not
depend on ξ, we will have XL(y) = XH(y) ∀y. In other words, these two pricing schedules cannot be
two distinct equilibria since they share a common value of default. A symmetric argument can be made
when ξ¯ = ξH , and thus the confidence sunspot can only ever be randomizing over one equilibrium pricing
schedule. The other schedule is not an equilibrium. .
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